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Abstract This paper critically analyzes Sherrilyn Roush’s (Tracking truth: knowl-
edge, evidence and science, 2005) definition of evidence and especially her powerful
defence that in the ideal, a claim should be probable to be evidence for anything. We
suggest that Roush treats not one sense of ‘evidence’ but three: relevance, leveraging
and grounds for knowledge; and that different parts of her argument fare differently
with respect to different senses. For relevance, we argue that probable evidence is
sufficient but not necessary for Roush’s own two criteria of evidence to be met. With
respect to grounds for knowledge, we agree that high probability evidence is indeed
ideal for the central reason Roush gives: When believing a hypothesis on the basis
of e it is desirable that e be probable. But we maintain that her further argument that
Bayesians need probable evidence to warrant the method they recommend for belief
revision rests on a mistaken interpretation of Bayesian conditionalization. Moreover,
we argue that attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments with Bayesianism fail. For
leveraging, which we agree is a matter of great importance, the requirement that
evidence be probable suffices for leveraging to the probability of the hypothesis if
either one of Roush’s two criteria for evidence are met. Insisting on both then seems
excessive. To finish, we show how evidence, as Roush defines it, can fail to track the
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hypothesis. This can remedied by adding a requirement that evidence be probable,
suggesting another rationale for taking probable evidence as ideal—but only for a
grounds-for-knowledge sense of evidence.
Keywords Evidence · Philosophy of science · Probability · Surprising evidence
1 Introduction
Evidence has always been a central topic in the philosophy of science. But with debates
raging throughout the US and the UK about what counts as evidence for evidence-
based policy, the topic has become one of immediate practical importance. This makes
very timely Sherrilyn Roush’s recent efforts to characterize evidence.
Roush presents her account near the end of her detailed development of a tracking
theory of knowledge, now one of the central topics in epistemology. Even if tracking
is not the correct or the only good account of knowledge, it would certainly be a plus
to have a theory of evidence for which it could be assumed that anything that counts
as evidence is a source of tracking knowledge. We shall here look into the question of
how her theory of evidence dovetails with her tracking view of knowledge.
Our primary topic, however, is another important claim that Roush defends. Roush
claims for her account the special virtue that it “explains why better evidence makes
knowledge more probable” (Roush 2005, p. 185). This seems a truism: What we mean
by better evidence for h is evidence that makes h more probable. But this is not what
Roush means. For her, ‘better evidence’ is evidence that has a higher probability.
If e is to be evidence for anything, she maintains, it is ideal that P(e) be high.
This conclusion matters, and not just for the philosophical explication of the con-
cept of evidence. Now that evidence-based policy is widely mandated, guides outlining
what counts as evidence for policy effectiveness proliferate.1 Roush’s demand for high
P(e) is at their heart. The guides offer schemes that rank methods for producing evi-
dence according to the degree of certainty that the method confers on the conclusions
it produces: High-quality evidence claims are claims produced by methods that make
it likely that those claims are true, claims e for which P(e) is high,2 No policy rec-
ommendation can get a top-grade rating unless it has top-ranked evidence claims in
its favour. For these guides it is not only ‘ideal’ that P(e) be high if e is to count as
evidence; it is necessary.3
1 For instance evidence evaluation schemes from the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network, the
International Agency for Cancer Research, or the Maryland rules in criminology.
2 The guides clearly seem to make the assumption that high probability can be assigned to results from
reliable methods. While an important issue, this is tangential to concerns here about whether a claim must
have high probability if it is to be counted as evidence.
3 This raises a question as to how to interpret probabilities. Roush claims that her definition of evidence
is compatible with both subjectivist and objectivist readings. In Sect. 3 we explore issues relating to the
subjectivist interpretation of probabilities when we consider Roush’s argument from a Bayesian standpoint.
To interpret Roush in an objectivist way, we avoid standard controversies in the philosophy of probability
by assuming that e and h both denote event-types. This, however, is not to say we believe that it is straight-
forward to find an interpretation of probability that makes sense of Roush’s definition of evidence or her
arguments for probable evidence. Indeed, the difficulties discussed in Sect. 3.2 suggest otherwise.
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There is a simple reason why one might adopt this view. It is almost certainly what
motivates the ranking schemes and it is one of the reasons Roush herself gives: If e
is to be good evidence for h, e should provide good reason to believe h. Surely we
shouldn’t believe h on the basis of e unless there is good reason to believe e. So P(e)
should be high. We shall here accept this line of defence for high P(e) without discus-
sion and concentrate on the rest of Roush’s discussion, for she has far more than this to
offer. In particular she develops two original, challenging defences of high P(e), both
of which open new perspectives on the age-old topic of evidence. The first is based on
an interesting mathematical relationship and a related series of graphs and the second
on arguments against modelling surprising evidence as evidence with low probability.
We shall argue that these defences do not carry the conclusion. In good part that
is because there is not one conclusion in Roush’s discussion but three, all expressed
in the same words: High P(e) is ideal if e is to be evidence for h. We claim that there
are three conclusions because we think there are three different senses of ‘evidence’
at play in Roush’s discussion, senses that are important to distinguish independent of
their role in the specific issue of P(e). They are:
(1) Evidence as the ground for knowledge.4 In order for e to be evidence for h, e
should be an appropriate basis for knowledge that h. The version of ‘evidence as
the ground for knowledge’ we find in Roush supposes both that h be true—“as
it must be for anyone to know it” (Roush 2005, p. 153) and also that e provides
grounds for believing it so.5
(2) Evidence as a two-place relevance relation (‘e is evidence for h’) between prop-
ositions or possible events, in which the evidence is supposed to be relevant to
the truth of the hypothesis, without any presumption about whether either the
evidence or the hypothesis is true.
(3) Evidence for a hypothesis h as a lever to infer P(h), that is, knowledge about
the evidence or its probability can be used to deduce informative, previously
unknown constraints on P(h), or better, P(h) itself.
The second is the usual topic of confirmation theories and one could take it that
Roush’s explication is aimed here since she engages with the conventional literature
at various points. It is at any rate an important topic, and again, not one just of philo-
sophical interest. Consider hypothesis testing or policy deliberation. Gathering facts,
finding out what is true and what is not, conducting experiments, even just sitting and
discussing the facts is costly and time consuming. So one wants a concept of evidence
4 The idea here is similar to Williamson’s ‘E = K’ thesis (2000, p. 185) that evidence is just what we
know. This thesis is motivated, as with Roush, by a desire to use evidence to justify belief in a hypothe-
sis. Williamson’s treatment is similar to Roush’s in other respects as well. For instance, he requires that
P(h|e) > P(h) for e to be evidence which is equivalent to Roush’s discrimination condition. However, he
does not adopt a condition similar to Roush’s indication condition P(h|e) > 1/2. Instead Williamson uses
the fact that evidence is knowledge and the requirement that P(h|e) > P(h) to justify belief in the hypothesis
from evidence
5 As Roush puts it in her discussion of tracking and evidence “… if h is true—as it must be for anyone to
know it—and e tracks h then it is unlikely that e is false. And, if e is false, then because the subject’s belief
in e tracks e, the subject is unlikely to believe e. Since b(h) tracks b(e), the probability of b(h) given b(e) is
low too. All of this suggests that if the subject knows h through this trajectory, then because in order to do
that she must believe h, e is likely to be true.” (Roush 2005, p. 153).
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that tells what facts bear on the hypothesis in order to decide which ones to find out
about, which experiments to run or which facts to let onto the table for discussion.
This is looking at evidence from the perspective of the deliberation process, prior to
any views about whether what is admitted as evidence provides sufficient grounds for
believing the hypothesis, i.e. before considerations about issue (1). This perspective
also fits particularly nicely with Roush’s own concerns, which we separate out as issue
(3), that evidence should provide leverage. She does not want P(h) to be presupposed
in our attempts to settle if her two central requirements for evidence are met because
that would undermine our ability to leverage from the evidence to the hypothesis.
Roush’s discussion of high P(e) does not differentiate these three notions, yet P(e)
seems to fare differently in each. For sense 1 it seems natural to suppose evidence
should have high probability for the trivial reason that e can hardly be the basis for
knowledge that h if e isn’t itself true, or highly probable, just as the evidence-ranking
schemes suppose. But high P(e) should surely be omitted as a criterion for evidence
in sense 2. For sense 3, we shall argue, none of Roush’s three criteria are necessary.
We look at Roush’s defences of high P(e) in Sect. 3, evaluating them both on their
own merit and with an eye to disentangling sense 1 and 2 of ‘evidence’. We look at
leveraging in Sect. 4. In Sect. 5 we produce a simple counterexample to show that,
strictly speaking, evidence for h as defined by Roush does not imply that e tracks h,
contrary to her hopes.
2 Roush’s graphical analysis and definition of evidence
Roush constructs her definition of evidence from two desiderata. The first is that
evidence should discriminate between hypotheses. She takes this to mean that if e is
evidence for h then P(e|h)> P(e|¬h), or, in terms of the likelihood ratio (LR = P(e|h)/
P(e|¬h)) that LR > 1.6 Roush takes the discrimination condition to be uncontrover-
sial and focuses greater attention on a second desideratum, the indication condition,
P(h|e) > 0.5. The motivation for this is that evidence should, when true, make the
hypothesis more likely than not, thus giving us some reason to believe h (rather than
its alternative ¬h).7 These are both well rehearsed conditions, familiar from debates
about how to define what we have prised out under the label ‘evidence as a relevance
relation’. For present purposes we shall take her arguments for them as sufficient for
evidence in a relevance sense since our focus is on her further requirement that P(e)
be high.
Roush defines evidence so that both desiderata are met, with particular emphasis
on the indication condition.
R: e is some/good evidence for h if and only if “there is a lower bound greater
than 1 on [LR] and a lower bound greater than 0 on P(e) such that P(h|e) is
6 She further invokes a number of authors to argue that the likelihood ratio is the best measure of how good
evidence is at discriminating.
7 Roush notes “… we do not have good reason to believe, or even some reason to believe, a hypothesis is
true, if we have no assurance that the posterior probability [P(h|e)] > 0.5” (Roush 2005, p. 165).
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greater than 0.”/“greater than some high threshold appropriate to having good
reason to believe” (Roush 2005, p. 183).
Despite its roundabout formulation in terms of lower bounds, the definition is log-
ically equivalent to the following simpler definition.
(DEF1) e is some[alternatively, good] evidence for h if and only if
DC (Discrimination Condition): LR > 1
IC (Indication Condition): P(h|e) > 0.5 [alternatively, P(h|e) > a, where
a is some chosen level greater than 0.5]
But this definition does not sit well with other statements made by Roush:
“An obvious solution … is to adopt as a second condition for e to be evidence
the demand that …P(h|e), be high. However, that is merely a restatement of our
desideratum.” (emphasis added, Roush 2005, p. 166).
Also, the lack of reference to a lower bound on P(e) in (DEF1) ignores the importance
Roush attributes to evidence being probable:
R-addendum: “high P(e) is not necessary but is ideal” (Roush 2005, p. 183).
This suggests that (DEF1) is not an adequate interpretation of Roush’s definition of
evidence. An alternative, more suitable definition can be discerned by careful con-
sideration of Roush’s graphical analysis, where she uses a series of graphs to explain
the connection between lower bounds on LR and P(e) and IC. These are based on an
identity that she establishes using the probability axioms:
A. P(h|e) = [LR − P(e|h)/P(e)] /[LR − 1].
She points out that A implies facts about how P(h|e) can increase under special cir-
cumstances. The special circumstances are that
(1) LR > 1
(2) LR is held fixed
(3) P(e|h) is held fixed.
Note that this implies that P(e|¬h) is also fixed.
Given these three conditions it follows from A that
B. P(h|e) increases with increasing P(e).
Roush elaborates on B defending her advice that P(e) should ideally be high by taking
the reader through a series of graphs and formulae.
We summarize her eight graphs in Fig. 1.
Her graph for P(e) = 0.4 is the one she presents first. On it is displayed a shaded
area above the P(e) = 0.4 line in Fig. 1, representing the continuum of lines graphing
P(h|e) versus LR for the continuum of values of P(e) possible above P(e) = 0.4.
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Fig. 1 P(h|e) versus LR for various fixed P(e) with P(e|h) = 1
She explains:
“This graph presents a convenient lower limit for the trends that we will see when
we increase LR and P(e). The result is this: this surface bounds from below in
the [P(h|e)] dimension every graph with LR > 1 and P(e) > 0.4, and as these terms
increase the [P(h|e)] term increases. That is, as LR and P(e) increase above 1
and 0.4, respectively, the value of P(h|e), for any given values of P(e|h) and the
LR, monotonically rises to 1. We can see why this is by inspecting the equation
P(h|e) = [LR − P(e|h)/P(e)] /(LR − 1)
If we suppose that the LR is some fixed value greater than 1, then P(e|h) will
be greater than or equal to P(e)… In other words, increasing P(e) with fixed or
rising LR will have the effect of increasing P(h|e).” (Roush 2005, p. 168)
This means that with fixed LR, high enough P(e) guarantees whatever value of P(h|e)
is demanded. Specific values for P(h|e) are necessary on Roush’s characterization for
e to be some/good evidence for h. Supposing LR > 1, it follows that high enough P(e)
is a sufficient condition for a condition (viz. P(h|e) > a) that is necessary for e to be
some/good evidence for e. High P(e) is not necessary though, as Roush herself notes
in places. We stress this because we found some comments in her text that could be
misleading on this.8
Roush’s graphical analysis also suggests a corresponding definition of evidence.
In her analysis, the lower bounds on LR and P(e) that are sufficient for IC are inde-
pendent of the value of P(e|h). Indeed, she states as much: “Through graphing P(e|h),
P(e) and the LR, we have found a result that is independent of P(e|h) and depends
only on P(e) and LR.” (Roush 2005, p. 168) Though she does not say this explicitly,
8 For instance, when she says “my proposal, then, is that the second condition on evidence, the indication
condition, be a lower bound on the value of P(e)”. Or just after, “there are three broad questions to ask about
this idea…a third is whether high P(e) is plausibly a necessary condition for evidence, since there seem to
be counterexamples” (Roush 2005, p. 171).
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this suggests that Roush intends the lower bounds on LR and P(e) in her definition of
evidence to be independent of the value of P(e|h). To construct a corresponding for-
mal definition of evidence, it is first instructive to construct lower-bound conditions
equivalent to DC and IC. In the appendix we prove:
C. DC and IC if and only if there exist x > 1, y > 0 and 0 < z ≤ 1 such that
(i) LR ≥ x
(ii) P(e) > y
(iii) P(e|h)≤z
(iv) x – z/yx−1 = 1/2
Condition (iii) shows how, given lower bounds on P(e) and LR, whether DC and IC
are met depends on P(e|h). Roush’s apparent desire to construct a definition of evidence
in terms of lower bounds that are independent of P(e|h) suggests the following natural
move: To stipulate that z=1 so that condition (iii) becomes P(e|h) ≤ 1, which always
holds regardless of the value of P(e|h). This suggests defining evidence this way:9
(DEF 2) e is some [alternatively, good] evidence for h if and only if there exist
x > 1, y > 0 such that
(i) LR ≥ x
(ii) P(e) > y
(iii) x – 1/yx − 1 = 1/2 [alternatively x – 1/yx − 1 = a for appropriate a > 1/2]
(DEF2) fits Roush’s roundabout expression and gives P(e|h)-independent lower bounds
in line with her graphical analysis. It also makes explicit a trade-off: As the lower bound
on LR strengthens, the lower bound on P(e) can weaken and vice versa. Given this
trade-off, high P(e) is not necessary for e to be evidence, since for any low y there is a
sufficiently high x that ensures that e is evidence. Yet for any given x, a higher y raises
the lower bound on P(h|e) setting out how more probable evidence is ideal. In these
ways the above definition of evidence neatly fits Roush’s discussion.
In this definition IC and DC are necessary but not sufficient for evidence as can
be seen in the following probability distribution:
P(e) = 0.6001, P(h) = 0.8, LR = 2
For this distribution P(h|e) ≈ 8/9. But e is not evidence because the lower bound on
P(e) would have to be less than 0.6001 and by (iii) this implies that the lower bound
on LR would have to be greater than 21/3, which is false. This example shows that
this version of Roush’s definition has an undesirable consequence of ruling out some
cases where e is probable and IC and DC are met. Why shouldn’t e count as evidence
in cases like this?
What is missing here is why a definition of evidence should be constructed in terms
of lower bounds of LR and P(e) that are independent of the value of P(e|h). Though
Roush does not explicitly discuss this, one candidate answer is that it yields a leverage
9 This reading is in accord with suggestions from an anonymous referee.
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advantage by it allowing one to classify e as evidence without needing to know P(e|h).
Roush’s discussion of the leverage advantage of using a lower bound on P(e) (Roush
2005, p. 170) suggests that this may be her motivation. However, this leverage advan-
tage comes at a cost, since it rules out the case above, which seems paradigmatically
evidence on Roush’s terms (IC and DC are met, P(e) is high). Moreover ignorance
of P(e|h) also makes it hard to evaluate LR!
Finally, it should be stressed that, though Roush’s definition requires the existence
of a lower bound on P(e), it does not require that evidence be probable at all, since the
lower bound on P(e) can—provided LR is high enough—be arbitrarily close to zero.
So, although probable evidence is defended by Roush as ideal, it is not a necessary
condition of evidence as she defines it. We think this is an advantage, since we now
defend improbable evidence.
3 In defence of improbable evidence
We find in Roush three major arguments that high P(e) is ideal:
• The argument from equation A and the accompanying graphs.
• An argument against a simple story of Bayesian updating.
• High P(e) has a leveraging advantage for finding P(h).
The first argument seems most suited to a relevance sense of evidence, but we dis-
cuss it in Sect. 3.1 more or less on its own grounds without putting weight on our view
that there are three different senses of evidence involved in Roush’s discussion. The
second argument seems geared to knowledge as a grounds for knowledge. Bayesian
updating allows that surprising evidence—in the sense of evidence with low prob-
ability—can increase the degree of belief in a hypothesis more than non-surprising
evidence. Roush’s discussion seems to suppose that this is incompatible with her view
that evidence should have high probability. We address this in Sect. 3.2. Section 3.3
briefly considers other shorter defences Roush offers for high P(e). We take up lever-
aging in Sect. 4.
3.1 Low probability evidence can satisfy DC and IC maximally
We assume, for the sake of argument, that high P(e) is a reasonable requirement on
evidence as a ground to knowledge. But we do not see how it can be taken as an
ideal way to satisfy the definition Roush offers, which at any rate we think is best
seen as a reasonable candidate for defining a relevance notion of evidence. For despite
Roush’s proposal, a lower probability claim can make for better evidence using her
own criteria.
Suppose P(e|h) = 1,10 which is one way to model ‘h explains e’ in the deductive-
nomological account of explanation. Then Bayes Theorem reduces to
10 Similar examples can be generated for any fixed non-zero value of P(e|h). Note that given P(e|h) = 1,
e is evidence if and only if it satisfies DC and IC.
123
Synthese (2010) 175:289–310 297
D. P(h|e) = P(h)/P(e).
Since P(e|h) = 1, it is follows that
E. P(e) = P(h) + P(e|¬h)P(¬h)
and so
F. P(h|e) = P(h)/ [P(h) + P(e|¬h)P(¬h)].
Given P(e|h) = 1 it also follows that
G. LR = 1/P(e|¬h).
So lowering P(e) by lowering P(e|¬h) simultaneously produces improvements in LR
and in P(h|e), making e better evidence for h on both Roush’s criteria. While it is
true, as she concludes, that “increasing P(e) with fixed or rising LR will have the
effect of increasing P(h|e)” (Roush 2005, p. 168), it is equally true that decreasing
P(e) with rising LR can have the effect of increasing P(h|e). Thus, the graphs hardly
provide a strong argument for increasing P(e) in order to satisfy the criteria for evi-
dence.
Not only can lowering P(e) raise both LR and P(h|e), but both conditions DC and
IC can be maximally satisfied while P(e) takes any value whatsoever. Suppose e is a
perfect sign of h; i.e. e ≡ h. Then P(h|e) = 1 and LR is infinitely high, but P(e) can be
as small or as large as one would like. This example has another nice aspect. Whenever
there are two independent criteria for the same thing, trade-offs may be required, but
here a trade-off is avoided. In this case (or any case with fixed P(e|h)) less probable
evidence can be better evidence by both criteria at once.
We should also note that Roush’s graphical arguments for high P(e) depend on the
asymmetry with which she treats the two independent criteria for evidence. Suppose
e is ‘candidate’ evidence for h in the sense that DC is well satisfied (i.e. LR is high).
Then high P(e) is sufficient for the satisfaction of IC. But the exactly symmetric claim
is not true. Suppose e is ‘candidate’ evidence for h in the sense that IC is well satisfied.
Then it is not true that high P(e) is sufficient for the satisfaction of DC.11 So high P(e)
is useful for obtaining high P(h|e) when LR is sufficiently high, but high P(e) is not
sufficient for high LR when P(h|e) is high. Yet there seems to be no special reason for
considering either criterion differently from the other.12
3.2 A Bayesian defence of improbable evidence and a frequency defence of probable
evidence
As a prelude to our arguments, we first set out two distinct analyses on how the prob-
ability of evidence relates to the probability of the hypothesis. The first is Roush’s
while the second is an analysis often presented to support the conventional claim that
evidence with a lower probability makes a hypothesis more probable (all else being
equal) than evidence with a higher probability.
11 See Theorem 2 in the appendix.
12 We have not here rehearsed Roush’s arguments for DC and IC but we don’t find anything in them that
gives a reason to treat the two in this different way.
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Table 1 Two analyses of the relationship between P(e) and P(h|e)
Analysis Fixed factors Change to P(e) Resulting change
in P(h|e)
Resulting changes
in other factors
Roush LR (>1), P(e|h) P(e) increases P(h|e) increases P(h) increases, P(e|¬h) fixed
Conventional P(e|h), P(h) P(e) decreases P(h|e) increases LR increases, P(e|¬h)
decreases
Section 2 described Roush’s argument that if LR is sufficiently high a lower bound
on P(e) is sufficient for a lower bound on P(h|e). Importantly, given Roush’s con-
straints—P(e|h) fixed and LR fixed (>1)—P(e) increases if and only if P(h) increases.
A second analysis, one conventionally used in discussions of the greater confirma-
tion power of surprising evidence,13 follows from Bayes Theorem:
P(h|e) = P(h)P(e|h)/P(e)
In this case, assuming P(e|h) and P(h) are fixed, P(h|e) increases as P(e) decreases.
In this case, LR must increase and P(e|¬h) decrease when P(e) decreases. Labelling
evidence that has lower probability as ‘more surprising’, this result shows that the
more surprising e is, the higher P(h|e) is.
These two analyses can be summarised in Table 1.
Since both analyses follow from the probability axioms, there is no contradiction
between them despite their apparently conflicting conclusions as to the relationship
between changes in P(e) and changes in P(h|e). As the table makes clear, the difference
is due to different factors being held fixed.
This is just arithmetic with probabilities. However, both analyses are used to make
arguments as to the significance of the probability of evidence. The conventional anal-
ysis is used to argue, via Bayesian updating, that the more surprising evidence is, the
more confirmation it lends to the hypothesis once learned. This clearly involves evi-
dence in the sense of grounds to knowledge. Roush’s is used to support her claims that
more probable evidence is ‘ideal’ and if there is to be a conflict at all, this must involve
evidence in the same sense. To clarify the dispute we shall first consider what Roush’s
analysis looks like in a ‘Bayesian’ framework, then what it looks like in a ‘frequentist’
framework. By a ‘Bayesian framework’ we mean one in which probabilities represent
degrees of belief and in which on learning a new fact e, probabilities are ‘updated’ by
changing from the ‘prior’ probability (labelled Pi(•)) to a new ‘posterior’ probability
(labelled Pf(•))by the rule : Pf(•) = Pi(•|e).
Interpreted in a Bayesian way, Roush’s analysis can then be expressed as follows.
If the agent holds a higher prior degree of belief in e, but the same values for Pi(e|h)
and Pi(e|¬h), then on learning e the agent would have a higher posterior degree of
belief in h than would have been the case had the agent learned e while holding the
lower prior belief in e. Though this is a consistent Bayesian account of how higher
priors in e can be advantageous for obtaining a higher posterior in h on learning e,
13 See, for example, (Howson and Urbach 2005, p. 97).
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there is problem. The agent can only have the higher prior in e, given the other fixed
conditional probabilities, if the agent also has a higher prior in the hypothesis. This
follows from the fact that the higher Pi(e) also implies a higher Pi(h) given the factors
Roush holds fixed. There is then no reason to attribute the higher posterior in the
hypothesis to the higher prior in the evidence (as Roush would like) rather than to the
higher prior Pi(h).
In contrast the conventional analysis avoids this difficulty. Here Pi(h) is fixed when
comparing the cases where evidence has low and high prior degrees of belief. Thus,
the higher posterior degree of belief in h once e has been learned is attributable to the
lower prior degree of belief in the evidence under the conventional view. Indeed, this
is just the Bayesian story as to why surprising evidence confirms more: Evidence with
a lower prior once learned raises the posterior in the hypothesis more assuming fixed
values for the probability for the hypothesis and for the conditional probability of the
evidence given the hypothesis.
Unsurprisingly perhaps, given this tension between her analysis and a Bayesian
interpretation, Roush rejects the premise that P(h) should be fixed when comparing
high and low probability evidence. Instead she takes it that high P(e) should make a
difference to P(h) before learning that e is the case:
“Your degree of belief in e prior to the conditionalisation is just P(e), so high
P(e) is (almost) sufficient for you to take e as evidence for whatever e happens
to be positively relevant to, that is, to conditionalize upon it. Roughly, if you
are confident of e, then you ought to let your other beliefs feel the appropriate
effects of e’s truth” (Roush 2005, p. 174)
However, for a Bayesian this is irrational, since if P(e) is less than one then this
means that the agent does not believe e is certain and would not rationally “let [their]
other beliefs feel the appropriate effects of e’s truth”.14
Roush, however, takes her unorthodox interpretation of Bayesian updating to be
virtuous, since it fits with her view that for e to be evidence for anything else it must
itself be probable:
“It seems to me inescapable that in order for the value of P(e) that precedes
Bayesian strict conditionalization to justify Bayesian strict conditionalization
P(e) must be high” (Roush 2005, p. 174).
It is as if Roush supposes that Bayesians have a three-step process. Agents begin
with degrees of belief represented by the ‘antecedent’ probability Pi. At the first step
they observe e. At the second they decide on this basis that the probability of e should
be 1. Because the probability of e is 1 they are justified, at the third step, in changing
their degrees of belief to those represented by the ‘posterior’ probability Pf . But of
course Bayesians do not take three steps, only two. They observe e at the first step and
at the second, revise their probabilities in one fell swoop to Pf , which among other
features sets the probability of e to 1. For the Bayesian the new probability is justified
14 Note that Jeffrey conditionalization does not help here, since conditionalization on the original value of
P(e) does not lead to any change in the degrees of belief, and conditionalizing on a different value of P(e)
is inconsistent with the agent’s degree of belief in e.
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by learning e, not by the fact that one has become confident of e (i.e., already set the
probability of e high). The posterior probability is an expression of one’s confidence,
not a justification of it. The Bayesian is far more objective here than Roush would have
it: It is observations that justify new degrees of belief, not simply one’s antecedent
degrees of confidence.
These difficulties suggest a possible fix: Do not assume e is certain when it is not, but
use Jeffrey conditionalization, under which Pf(•) = Pi(•|e)Pf(e) + Pi(•|¬e)Pf(¬e).
With this approach one might be able to argue that it is better to have a higher prior in
the evidence, assuming identical Pi(e|h)and Pi(e|¬h), than otherwise. However, as it
happens this runs into the same difficulty as the strict conditionalization case, namely
a higher prior in the hypothesis is implied when there is a higher prior in the evidence.
Thus, even with Jeffrey conditionalization, the higher posterior cannot be attributed
to the higher prior in the evidence.15
Perhaps a resolution lies elsewhere. In her examples16 Roush describes scientists or
doctors finding out that the evidence is probable, arguing that having a high probabil-
ity here is important. This may suggest that the way to make sense of the importance
of probable evidence for Roush is take evidence to be probable once the agent has
become confident of it, that is, to take her demand that the probability of the evidence
to be high to refer to the posterior rather than prior probability of the evidence.17 This
would assume Jeffrey conditionalization, since in the strict updating case the posterior
of the evidence is always one, so more or less probable evidence cannot be modelled.18
At first blush, this modified approach looks promising. To see why, assume iden-
tical priors in the evidence and in the hypothesis in order to allow one to attribute
the greater confirmation power to the higher probability of evidence. With Jeffrey
conditionalization, the higher the posterior in the evidence, the higher the posterior in
the hypothesis.19 Yet this is not consistent with Roush’s analysis, since under these
assumed conditions, Pi(h|e) (which under Jeffrey conditionalization equals Pf (h|e))
must be the same across the comparison of higher and lower probability evidence.
Moreover, this proposed analysis amounts to an argument that it is better to learn more
probable evidence because it raises the posterior in the hypothesis more. But since
P(h|e) is unchanged, this is not an argument that probable evidence makes for better
evidence in a relevance sense. It is rather an argument that learning more probable
15 This is as one would expect given that it is a generalisation of the strict Bayesian case already discussed.
16 Such as the Rutherford example (Roush 2005, p. 174) and her hypothetical medical test example (Roush
2005, p. 171).
17 Such a reading also fits well with some of Roush’s comments: “P(e) reports actual degree of belief, not
how much you expected at some prior stage that you would believe e at this stage” (Roush 2005, p. 175).
18 Yet another option would be to move to Jeffrey conditionalization, take P(e) to be a posterior but stick
to something akin to Roush’s three-step updating by allowing the updating to P(e) before updating other
degrees of belief on e. This might better describe how beliefs change in practice and could also help
modelling ‘old evidence’ situations, since old evidence could be modelled as evidence which has already
been updated upon specifically, but which has not been updated upon generally. However, this approach
also requires that the agent hold incoherent degrees of belief which undesirable when one is arguing for a
normative model of belief, as Roush is doing.
19 This follows immediately from the formula for Jeffrey conditionalization: i.e. the greater Pf (e) is (assum-
ing LRi > 1), the greater Pf (h) will be.
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evidence makes for better grounds-for-knowledge evidence since it leads to a higher
posterior in h. But that more probable evidence makes for better grounds for knowledge
is not in dispute.20
Turn finally to the frequency perspective on probability, from which Roush’s argu-
ment for probable evidence can be made sense of. Consider two populations where
event-types h and e both occur, where P(e|h) and P(e|¬h) are the same across both
populations, and where LR > 1. It follows by Roush’s analysis that if e is more long-
run frequent—in this sense more probable—in the first population, then the probability
that h occurs in the subpopulation where e occurs must also be greater for that popu-
lation. This shows that if an event-type is more probable (in the frequency sense), it
must also be more positively relevant to h, assuming P(e|h) and P(e|¬h) are the same
(again in the frequency sense).
Note that by contrast with the Bayesian cases above, the fact that h must also be
more probable in the population where e is more probable is not a problem. Far from
it, h’s being more probable in the first population shows that, in addition to more
probable evidence making for better relevance evidence (in that P(h|e) is higher),
it makes for better grounds for knowledge in that P(h) is higher. We must be care-
ful, however, about what claim ‘h’ represents. That P(h) is higher in one popula-
tion than another gives better grounds for knowledge of the claim that a randomly
drawn member of that population will be an h. Likewise the other probabilities, P(e)
and conditional probabilities, must be interpreted accordingly for the same popula-
tion.21
Finally, it is important to emphasise that not all of Roush’s examples of hypotheses
can be construed as event-types occurring in (ideally) ‘infinite’ populations. Nor can
most hypotheses for which we wish to have a theory of evidence. There are noto-
rious and well-rehearsed difficulties in applying this kind of frequentist account to
hypotheses of arbitrary form, which we need not repeat here.
3.3 What we conclude about Roush’s defences of high P(e)
In conclusion, independently of her arguments about tracking knowledge (which we
turn to in Sect. 5), Roush defends her claim that P(e) be high in order for e to be
evidence for anything on three fronts. The first involves arguments based on formula
A. and the accompanying graphs. These, we have argued, provide weak grounds for
the demand, if any at all. On the second front she attempts to defuse arguments to the
opposite conclusion, that P(e) should be low. One of her arguments on this front is that
20 A final attempt to find a suitable Bayesian interpretation of Roush’s argument might be to try to show
that a higher posterior in the evidence after Jeffrey conditionalization makes for higher Pf (h|e) assuming
identical posteriors for Pf (e|h), Pf (e|¬h) such that LRf > 1 in line with Roush’s formal analysis. We then
know, from Roush, that Pf (h|e) must be greater when Pf (e) is greater. But this also fails to give a plausible
Bayesian argument for probable evidence since it implies a higher prior in the hypothesis for the case where
one learns the more probable evidence (see Theorem 4 in appendix).
21 The importance of taking care when interpreting the probabilities can be seen in Eric Barnes’ recent
criticism of Roush’s medical example (Roush 2005, p. 171) where he argues that she equivocates in her
interpretation of P(e). See (Barnes 2008, pp. 554–555) for details.
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Bayesians need high P(e) to warrant updating degrees of belief. We have countered that
this argument rests on a mistake about the nature of Bayesian conditionalization. In a
further attempt to reconcile Roush’s arguments for probable evidence with Bayesian-
ism, we also considered Jeffrey conditionalization . The first case considered, Jeffrey
conditionalization with a higher prior in the evidence, entailed a higher prior in the
hypothesis undermining the attribution the greater confirmation power to the higher
probability of the evidence. The second case, Jeffrey conditionalization with a higher
posterior in the evidence, entailed a higher posterior in the hypothesis with P(h|e)
unchanged, thus showing how learning more probable evidence can be beneficial in a
grounds-for-knowledge rather than relevance sense.
In addition to these two fronts, Roush points out that with LR > 1 as the criterion, as
opposed to P(h|e) > P(h), e can still discriminate even if it has probability very close to
1. She also offers an alternative interpretation to some examples of Peter Achinstein
that were supposed to provide cases where “it is the very improbability of e that makes
it evidence for h” (p. 176). All these show either that P(e) need not be small or that it
is no harm for it to be big. This is in line with the view that follows from DC and IC,
that the probability of e is irrelevant to whether e is evidence or not.
The only positive argument for evidence—in a relevance sense—to be probable
was revealed when we considered a frequentist interpretation of Roush’s argument.
Here it was shown that higher probability evidence can be beneficial both in a grounds-
for-knowledge and relevance sense. This positive result, however, is somewhat tem-
pered by the well known limitations of frequentism for assigning probabilities to
hypotheses.
4 Leveraging
We want to use evidence for h to arrive at an assessment of P(h)—that’s what evidence
is supposed to be good for. If the ultimate aim is to use the evidence to arrive at an
assessment of P(h), it should not be necessary to assign a value to P(h) in order either
to assess P(e) or to assess whether e is evidence for h. In Roush’s terminology, we
should leverage to P(h) by using information other than P(h).
For Roush, evidence must meet both DC and IC. To assess if DC is met, it is
sufficient to assess LR and the usual and most immediate way to do this is to assess
P(e|h) and P(e|¬h). Formula A shows that all that is required in addition to assess
whether IC is met is an assessment of P(e). And the discussion following it shows
that high enough P(e) ensures IC, given that DC is met. So an ideal way to satisfy
DC and IC is for P(e) to be high. If we know this, we can know that e is evidence for
h without having to assess P(h).
Leveraging is an idea we entirely endorse (cf. Cartwright (2009)). Indeed the impor-
tance of leveraging cannot be stressed enough when it comes to considerations of the
use of evidence, considerations that we think philosophers need to keep centrally in
view in developing accounts of what evidence ‘really is’. Both pure science and policy
want to use evidence for h to help to arrive at a reliable estimate of P(h). This gives yet
another argument, based on the idea of leveraging, for concentrating as Roush does
on the size of P(e).
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Suppose one has gone down the route of demanding that evidence must have a high
likelihood ratio, as she supposes, or as many others suppose, must satisfy a relevance
requirement, like P(h|e) > P(h|¬e). In both cases, once it is known that either of these
requirements is met by knowing the relevant conditional probabilities, it remains only
to learn P(e) to fix P(h) because both the following formulae are true:
P(h) = P(h|e)P(e) + P(h|¬e)(1 − P(e))
P(h) = P(e) − P(e|¬h)
P(e|h) − P(e|¬h)
So from the point of view of leveraging, if one must know P(e) in order for e to be
usable as evidence (as one must given Roush’s requirement that P(e) is high), demand-
ing knowledge either of the components of the likelihood ratio or the components of
the relevance difference is enough. No additional requirements are needed, such as
DC. More may be needed to characterize what it is for e to be ‘relevant to’ the truth
of h, that is, for our second sense of evidence. But they are not needed for leveraging,
which can make do with far less. This is why we think it is important to prise the two
notions apart and to allow different accounts for them In particular, for leveraging,
tacking on requirements from the other senses of evidence can be highly restrictive.
When it comes to calculating a given target probability, any kind of information that
does the job is as good as any other. It all depends on what probability assignments
we already accept or can efficiently find out. The calculus of probability constrains
the relations among probabilistic facts, but a large variety of combinations can fix the
value for a given target. This suggests that no particular constraints should be put on
what probabilistic facts should be counted as evidence when it is evidence as leverage
to targeted probabilities that is at stake.22
Leveraging has two aspects, of which we have so far discussed only one. For evi-
dence of h to be of genuine use, not only should it help us calculate P(h), but it should
also be more accessible than P(h) itself. From this point of view we should like to
comment, albeit briefly, on a deep and controversial position that Roush defends: that
evidence should be characterized entirely in terms of probability. Roush argues that this
should be done in order to avoid introducing concepts in the explication of ‘evidence’
that are even more obscure than ‘evidence’ itself. Indeed, she claims, concepts are
often offered in explication of ‘evidence’ themselves generally receive their clearest
explication in terms of probabilities. Explanatory relevance is a prime example.
We take issue with this last claim, since it has been argued at length that causation,
and thereby causal explanation and thereby explanation in general, cannot be given a
purely probabilistic explication.23 But that is not the issue we would like to point to
here. Rather we worry about the fact that probabilities are hard to come by. It is for
this reason that we urge that the project of explicating ‘evidence’ should start a big
step before the starting position of Roush and others who offer purely probabilistic
accounts. For the purposes of both pure science and policy it is standard practice—and
22 Note too that in this case it is not knowledge of events that is being employed but rather knowledge of
their probabilities.
23 Cf., among works by many authors, Cartwright (1979, 1989)
123
304 Synthese (2010) 175:289–310
a practice we would wish to defend—to first gather the evidence and then to use it to
assess various probabilities, e.g. P(h), P(h|e), P(h|¬e), P(e|h) or P(e|¬h). And for this
we need guidelines about what counts as evidence that are not couched in terms of
probabilities. One might think of these guidelines as an approach to our second notion
of evidence as a two-place relevance relation. But it also helps with the accessibility
aspect of leveraging, since the idea is to isolate those kinds of facts that will help in the
assessment of the otherwise difficult to reach probabilities. This, however, is a project
much in its infancy in the contemporary philosophical literature.
5 Evidence and tracking
What is the connection between tracking and evidence as Roush defines it, and what
role does high P(e) play in it? Very roughly, x tracks y means that x and y are corre-
lated: They both obtain or fail to obtain together. Roush is concerned with the kinds
of cases common in philosophy of science in which a subject comes to know h via
believing evidence e. For this she maintains that high P(e) is required because
“...in this trajectory for knowing h not only is h true but also b(h) TRACKS b(e),
b(e) TRACKS e, and e TRACKS h. Now, if h is true—as it must be for anyone
to know it—and e TRACKS h then it is unlikely that e is false.” (Roush 2005,
p. 153) [b(x) = ‘The agent believes x.’]
This involves claims about beliefs whereas the relationship between evidence and
hypothesis does not involve belief. As one would expect therefore, the relevant con-
cept of tracking for evidence is different. Following (Roush 2005, p. 150) it can be
formulated as follows
Evidence e tracks a hypothesis h at level u (< 1) if and only if
TR1. P(e|h) > u
TR2. P(e|¬h) < 1 − u.
For Roush, it is important that evidence tracks the hypothesis because that ensures—
provided u is high enough and other tracking relations are met—the desirable epistemic
goal that belief in the hypothesis tracks the hypothesis.24
Note that one could take TR1 and TR2 to define evidence and call it ‘tracking
evidence’. By definition then, evidence would track the hypothesis and it would, fol-
lowing (Roush 2005, p. 154), meet intuitive indication and discrimination conditions.
Tracking evidence is also an example of a relevance concept of evidence. Here whether
or not e is tracking evidence for h depends purely on the relationship between e and
h, and the probabilities of e and h are no part of the characterization. Moreover, it has
the nice property that when e is tracking evidence, then P(e) and P(h) must be close
in value. But, whether P(e) and P(h) are high or low is independent of whether e is
tracking evidence for h.
24 This follows from the ‘transitivity enough’ property of the tracking relation (Roush 2005, pp. 151–152).
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Given the attractive properties of the tracking definition, one may wonder why
Roush does not adopt it. In short, (Roush 2005, p. 160) explains that she does not
define evidence in this tracking way because so defined, e being evidence for h does
not imply P(h|e) > 0.5. Thus, e can be evidence for h and yet fail to provide adequate
reason to believe h. Nevertheless Roush does not relinquish the aim that evidence
should track the hypothesis. So it is important to ask whether evidence as she defines
it meets the tracking requirement. It is not hard to see that it does not always do so. The
probability distribution specified by P(e) = 0.2, P(h) = 0.9, LR = 19 has P(h|e) =
0.994, P(e|h) = 0.22 and P(e|¬h) = 0.012. It is evidence under Roush’s definition,
but given the low value of P(e|h), e does not track h.
More generally, the relationship between Roush’s definition of evidence and track-
ing can be made clearer using two simple bounds on P(e|h) and P(¬e|h).25
(i) 1/LR ≥ P(e|¬h)
(ii) P(e)/P(h) ≥ P(e|h) > P(e)
When LR is sufficiently high, bound (i) implies that P(e|¬h) must be low and thus
that TR2 will be met. Likewise, bound (ii) shows that a high P(e) is sufficient for
TR1 . This fits Roush’s analysis well, since high LR and P(e) are shown together to be
sufficient for evidence to track. Moreover, the higher LR and P(e) are, the better the
tracking will be. However, bound (ii) also shows how tracking can fail when P(e) is
significantly smaller than P(h) since then P(e|h) must be small so TR2 fails. This is
what happens in the example above.
The relationship between Roush’s evidence and tracking suggests another rationale
for imposing a lower bound on P(e): To ensure that evidence tracks the hypothesis.
However, doing this does not just imply tracking. To see why, recall that tracking evi-
dence is a relevance concept. However, when supplemented with a requirement that
P(e) be high, one can infer that P(h) must also be (quite) high in virtue of e tracking
h. Therefore, imposing a high lower bound on P(e) ensures e tracks h and thus that
P(h) is high,26 which is what is required for a grounds-for-knowledge concept. So
high probability of evidence plays a double role, which arguably leads to a conflation
absent in the simple tracking concept of evidence. Probable evidence makes evidence
track the hypothesis, a feature characteristic of evidence in the relevance sense, and
simultaneously makes evidence a ground for knowledge.
To finish, it is interesting to note that Roush’s failure to define evidence so that it
implies that evidence tracks a hypothesis need not be a serious problem for her concept
of evidence. Tracking evidence is extremely powerful when one has it, since if one
knows the evidence is false, then one can be pretty sure the hypothesis is false, and
conversely. This, though highly desirable, is rarely met in practice. Often evidence
speaks for the truth of a hypothesis when we know it to hold, but when false does not
say much for the falsity for the hypothesis. For example, let
25 The bounds are derived as follows. First, LR = P(e|h)/P(e|¬h), so P(e|¬h) = P(e|h)/LR. But since
P(e|h) ≤ 1, it follows that P(e|¬h) ≤ 1/LR. Second, P(e|h) = P(e&h)/P(h), but P(e&h) ≤ P(e) because e&h
=> e, so P(e|h) ≤ P(e)/P(h). Finally because LR > 1, it follows that P(e|h) > P(e).
26 When LR > 1, 1 ≥ P(e|h) − P(e|¬h) > 0. But given P(h) = [P(e) − P(e|¬h)] / [P(e|h) − P(e|¬h)] it
follows that P(h) ≥ P(e) − P(e|¬h). Since high P(e) ensures tracking, P(e|¬h) is low and thus P(h) must
be at least almost as high as P(e).
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h: Jill murdered Jack
e: Jill’s fingerprints are on the murder weapon.
In this case, e is intuitively evidence for h. However, e does not track h: Suppose
that Jill is a careful, intelligent person and if she had decided to murder someone she
would have used gloves, so P(e|h) is low. Given a plausible probability distribution
assignment to e and h here, e would be good evidence for h. So Roush’s concept of
evidence models this situation well. In contrast, the tracking concept is overly strong
and rules the fingerprints out as evidence.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have clarified Roush’s definition of evidence and critically analyzed
her arguments that evidence should be probable. Roush’s first argument, based on
formula A and the associated graphs, we think is weak. These show that high P(e)
is sufficient but not necessary for e to be evidence. As we have shown, both of Ro-
ush’s criteria for evidence can be met maximally and P(e) take any value at all. Our
attempts to reconcile Roush’s arguments for probable evidence with Bayesianism at
best show that probable evidence makes for better grounds-for-knowledge evidence.
In our analysis only a frequentist interpretation supports an argument that more prob-
able evidence makes for better relevance evidence, but this is limited to cases where
frequentist probabilities can be applied.
The latter part of our paper discussed the role of leveraging and the relationship
between evidence and tracking. We strongly agree with Roush on the importance of
leveraging, particularly when using evidence in policy. We have argued, however, that
Roush’s two criteria for evidence are unduly restrictive from a leveraging view. Almost
any constraint on P(e) imposes a constraint on P(h) and thus serves the purpose of
leveraging P(h). As regards tracking we showed that evidence as Roush defines it can
fail to tracks the hypothesis. If Roush’s definition is supplemented with a require-
ment that evidence be probable then evidence does track the hypothesis. This suggests
another reason why Roush may see probable evidence as ideal. However, since the
concept of tracking evidence is restrictive this provides weak grounds at best for taking
probable evidence as ideal.
In sum it may be the case that high probability is a good thing to require of evi-
dence if evidence is to be a ground for knowledge, but when the aim is to assess more
accessible probabilities to leverage to P(h), high P(e) has no special advantage. And
when a two-place relevance relation is at stake, we think a convincing argument has
not yet been made.
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Appendix
Theorem 1 LR>1 and P(h|e)>a>0 if and only if there exist x>1, 1>y>0 and
0 < z ≤ 1 such that
(i) LR ≥ x
(ii) P(e)>y
(iii) P(e|h) ≤ z
(iv) x−z/yx−1 = a > 0
Proof ‘if’
First, (i) and x > 1 imply LR > 1.
Roush derives the following useful formula from the axioms of probability:
P(h|e) = LR − P(e|h)/P(e)
LR − 1 (1)
Solving for P(e) yields
P(e) = P(e|h)
LR(1 − P(h|e)) + P(h|e)
which with (ii) implies
P(e|h)
LR(1 − P(h|e)) + P(h|e) > y
=> P(e|h) > yLR(1 − P(h|e)) + yP(h|e)
which with (iii) implies
z > yLR(1 − P(h|e)) + yP(h|e)
=> [z/y − P(h|e)]/(1 − P(h|e)) > LR
Given (i), this then implies that
[
z/y − P(h|e)] /(1 − P(h|e)) > x
=> z/y > x(1 − P(h|e)) + P(h|e)
=> z/y > x − P(h|e)(x − 1)
=> P(h|e)(x − 1) > x − z/y
=> P(h|e) > (x − z/y)/(x − 1)
Finally, (iv) then implies that
P(h|e) > a > 0
unionsq
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‘only if’
Let z = P(e|h) so (iii) holds. From (1) it follows that
P(h|e) = LR − z/P(e)
LR − 1 (2)
Define the following function
f(p,q) = p − z/q
p − 1 for LR ≥ p > 1, P(e) > q > 0.
Given the continuity of the right hand side of (2), as p → LR and q → P(e) then
G(p, q) → P(h|e). Since P(h|e) > a, it follows by the definition of the limit there exist
x and y* such that LR ≥ x > 1 and P(e) > y∗ > 0 and
x − z/y∗
x − 1 > a
=> x − z/y∗ > a(x − 1)
=> x − a(x − 1) > z/y∗
=> y∗ > z/[x − a(x − 1)] (3)
Now define y by y = z/[x−a(x−1)].
Given x > 1, 0 < z ≤ 1 and 0 < a < 1 it follows that y > 0, and given (3) y* > y
follows. Since P(e) > y* it follows that P(e) > y.
We have shown that LR ≥ x > 1 and P(e) > y > 0 and y = z/[(1−a)x + a]. Solving
for a yields
x − z/y
x − 1 = a
The result follows. unionsq
Corollary 1 Given LR>1, P(h|e)>a>0 if and only if P(e) > P(e|h)/ [(1 − a)
LR+a] > 0.
Proof Let x = LR, z = P(e|h) and y = z/[(1−a)x+a]. For any LR and P(e|h) (i) and
(iii) are met and (iv) is met by definition of y. By the theorem therefore, P(e) > y if
and only if P(h|e) > a > 0. The result follows from substitution of P(e|h)/[(1−a)LR+a]
for y. unionsq
Corollary 2 Given LR>1,P(h|e) > 1/2 if and only if and P(e)>2P (e|h)/(LR+1)
Proof Follows from Corollary 1 for a = 1/2. unionsq
Corollary 3 LR>1 and P(e)>1/[(1−a)LR+a]>0⇒P(h|e)>a>0.
Proof Since
1 ≥ P(e|h), P(e) > 1/ [(1 − a)LR + a] > 0 => P(e) > P(e|h)/ [(1 − a)LR + a] >
0, the result then follows from Corollary 1. unionsq
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Corollary 4 LR > 1 and P (e) > 2/ (LR + 1) => P (h|e) > 1/2
Proof Follows from Corollary 3 for a = 1/2. unionsq
Theorem 2 Given LR>1, for any x>1 there do not exist a and y such that P(h|e)>a
and P(e)>y => LR>x.
Proof Solving (1) for LR yields
LR = [P(e|h)/P(e) − P(h|e)] /[1 − P(h|e)]
The right hand side is continuous in P(e) for any fixed value of P(e|h) and fixed
non-unitary value of P(h|e). Given this it follows that as P(e) → P(e|h), LR → 1.
Therefore imposing restrictions P(h|e) > a and P(e) > y can not imply LR > x for any
given x > 1, since one can always find a value of P(e) sufficiently close to P(e|h) such
that x > LR > 1 by the definition of the limit. unionsq
Theorem 3 Given LR>1, P(e|h) and P(e|¬h)fixed, P(h|¬e) strictly increases with P(e).
Proof
P(h|¬e) = P(h & ¬e)/P(¬e)
= [P(h) − P(h & e)] /[1 − P(e)]
= [P(h) − P(e)P(h|e)] / [1 − P(e)]
But by Bayes theorem, P(h) = [P(h|e)P(e)]/P(e|h) so substituting
P(h|¬e) = P(e)P(h|e) [1/P(e|h) − 1] / [1 − P(e)] (4)
All the terms in the numerator increase, strictly increase or stay constant with increas-
ing P(e) given fixed P(e|h), P(e|¬h), while the denominator strictly decreases. There-
fore, P(h|¬e) is a strictly increasing function of P(e). unionsq
Theorem 4 Consider two possible posterior situations after updating using Jeffrey
conditionalization on e. In one case one updates one’s degrees of belief on e to the
posterior Pf(e), in the other to Pf ∗ (e), where Pf(e) < Pf ∗ (e).
Notation:
LetPf(•) denote the posteriors obtained by updating on Pf(e).
Let Pi(•) denote the priors before updating on Pf(e).
Let Pf ∗ (•) denote the posteriors obtained by updating on Pf ∗ (e).
Let Pi ∗ (•) denote the priors before updating to Pf ∗ (e).
If
(a) Pf(e|h) = P∗f (e|h)
(b) Pf(e|¬h) = P∗f (e|¬h)
(c) LR = LR∗ > 1.
(d) Pi(e) = P∗i (e).
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Then Pi(h) < P∗i (h).
Proof General result: in Jeffrey conditionalization P(h|e) and P(h|¬e) remain
unchanged on updating on e.
So Pi(h|e) = Pf(h|e), Pi(h|¬e) = Pf(h|¬e), P∗i (h|e)
= P∗f (h|e) and P∗i (h|¬e) = P∗f (h|¬e).
By the axioms of probability:
Pi(h) = Pi(h|e)Pi(e) + Pi(h|¬e)Pi(¬e)
and
P∗i (h) = P∗i (h|e)P∗i (e) + P∗i (h|¬e)P∗i (¬e)
Substituting it follows that
Pi(h) = Pf(h|e)Pi(e) + Pf(h|¬e)Pi(¬e)
and
P∗i (h) = P∗f (h|e)P∗i (e) + P∗f (h|¬e)P∗i (¬e)
And by (d) it follows that
P∗i (h) = P∗f (h|e)Pi(e) + P∗f (h|¬e)Pi(¬e)
Since Pf(e)< P∗f (e), by Roush’s analysis it follows that Pf (h|e)< P∗f (h|e) and by The-
orem 3 that Pf(h|¬e) < P∗f (h|¬e). It follows by substitution of these inequalities into
the above that Pi(h) < P∗i (h). unionsq
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